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Agency Adjudication: It Is Time to Hit the Reset Button
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1
It would be nice to be able to use the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) to celebrate the present state of the agency adjudication process. Unfortunately, the process
of agency adjudication is in worse condition today than it was when Congress enacted the APA in 1946.
In section I of this contribution to a Symposium sponsored by the Center for the Study of the
Administrative State, I describe the history of the agency adjudication process beginning in the 1930s and
extending to the unfortunate state of the agency adjudication process at present. In section II, I describe
the present and likely future state of the adjudication process. In section III, I describe potential ways in
which we can change the agency adjudication process to allow it to function well in the future.
I. The History of Agency Adjudication
Throughout the 1930s, participants in agency adjudications complained that the hearing examiners (later
renamed Administrative Law Judges or ALJs) who presided in agency adjudicative hearings were biased in
favor of agencies and against private parties.2 They also complained that they could not predict how
agencies and ALJs would conduct a hearing. Agencies used a wide variety of procedures, and most
agencies had few if any rules that governed the hearing process. Several studies supported those
complaints.3
After fifteen years of study and debate, Congress unanimously enacted the APA.4 The APA responded to
the complaints of bias and lack of predictability by describing in detail the process that an agency must
use when it engages in adjudication. The procedures for adjudication are set forth in sections 554, 556,
and 557 of the APA.5 Those sections require an agency to make available to participants in agency
adjudications virtually all of the safeguards of the rights of litigants that are available in civil proceedings
in federal courts.
The APA also includes many provisions that are designed to assure that the ALJs who have roles analogous
to those of federal district judges have almost as much decisional independence as federal judges.6
Agencies have no control over an ALJ’s compensation.7 Agencies cannot evaluate the performance of an
ALJ.8 Ex parte communications with ALJs, including communications from agency officials, are prohibited.9
An agency must allocate cases among ALJs on a rotation basis except in unusual circumstances.10 No one
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who has any role in investigation or enforcement can supervise an ALJ.11 Agencies cannot assign ALJs
duties that are inconsistent with their roles as independent adjudicators.12 Agencies have the power to
appoint ALJs but only from a list of applicants who have been determined to be qualified by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM).13 That agency uses a variety of methods to determine whether an
applicant has the experience, training, and judicial temperament required to be an ALJ. The most
important safeguard against ALJ bias in favor of an agency is a provision that precludes an agency from
removing or otherwise punishing an ALJ. An agency can attempt to remove or otherwise discipline an ALJ
only by bringing a case against the ALJ at the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). That agency can
remove or otherwise punish an ALJ only after it conducts an oral evidentiary hearing in which it finds that
there is good cause to discipline the ALJ.14
Congress recognized that it was important to ensure that agencies can retain control over their policies.15
Congress included a provision in the APA that empowers an agency to replace the initial decision of an ALJ
with the agency’s own decision on appeal from an ALJ’s initial decision.16 Most agencies have procedures
through which anyone who is dissatisfied with an ALJ’s initial decision can appeal that decision to the head
of the agency. At that point, the agency has complete discretion to replace the ALJ’s initial decision with
its own decision. Agencies use the appeals process to ensure that ALJ’s cannot make final decisions that
are inconsistent with the agency’s policies. If a party is dissatisfied with the agency’s decision, it can obtain
review of that decision in a federal court. In that review proceeding, the ALJ’s initial decision is merely
part of the record that the court considers in deciding whether to uphold the agency decision.17
During the 1950s, the Supreme Court unanimously and repeatedly praised Congress for the manner in
which it responded to the complaints that agency hearing procedures were unpredictable and unfair and
that ALJ’s were biased in favor of agencies.18 In a unanimous 1950 opinion the Court praised Congress for
creating an adjudication system that was carefully designed to assure that participants in agency
adjudications were treated fairly.19 The Court expressed its belief that Congress had codified the minimum
requirements of due process in the APA provisions that govern agency adjudication, with particular
emphasis on the APA’s safeguards of the decisional independence of ALJs. The Court then began to apply
the APA to all agency adjudications whether or not Congress had explicitly made the APA applicable to
the proceedings.20
In an amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), Congress pointedly rejected the Court’s
interpretation of the APA as codifying due process and made it clear that Immigration Judges (IJs) are not
subject to the safeguards of the APA. In its 1955 opinion in Marcello v. Bonds,21 the Court retreated from
11
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its view that Congress had codified the minimum requirements of due process when it enacted the APA.
The Court applied the amendment to the INA, rather than the APA, even though Congress had refused to
confer on IJs any of the safeguards of decisional independence that apply to ALJs. The Court held that the
provisions of the APA that require agencies to use procedures that replicate those used by federal courts
and to use ALJs who have statutory assurances of decisional independence apply only to agency
adjudications that Congress has explicitly made subject to those provisions of the APA.
In the wake of the Court’s 1955 opinion, adjudications in which the agency is required to provide the
procedures described in sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA are customarily referred to as formal
adjudications. Adjudications that are not subject to those provisions of the APA are referred to as informal
adjudications. Agencies that conduct informal adjudications have discretion to choose their own
procedures. Most agencies that engage in informal adjudication have adopted rules of procedure that
confer on participants procedural safeguards that satisfy the requirements of due process, but they do
not use ALJs to preside in those proceedings.22
The agency officials who preside in informal adjudications have a variety of titles such as Administrative
Patent Judge or Board of Contract Appeals Judge. They are often referred to collectively as Administrative
Judges (AJs) to distinguish them from ALJs. Like the immigration judges that were the subject of the
Court’s opinion in Marcello v. Bonds, they have few, if any, of the statutory safeguards of decisional
independence that apply to ALJs.23 Thus, they are far more vulnerable than ALJs to the pro-agency bias
that was common in all agency adjudications prior to the enactment of the APA.
Over the decades since the Court’s decision in Marcello v. Bonds, Congress has enacted scores of statutes
that authorize agencies to conduct adjudications. Most of those statutes allow the agencies to conduct
informal adjudications rather than formal adjudications and to use AJs rather than ALJs to preside in the
hearings. As a result, there are now over five times as many AJs as ALJs.24 Each of the thousands of AJs is
highly susceptible to pro-agency bias, and there is abundant evidence that many AJs act in ways that
reflect that bias.25
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) published a lengthy study of this phenomenon
in 1992.26 It expressed dismay that Congress and agencies had reverted to the methods of conducting
agency adjudications that led to the well-supported and widespread complaints of pro-agency bias in the
22
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1930s. ACUS urged Congress and agencies to abandon the practice of using potentially biased AJs to
preside in adjudications and urged them to replace AJs with ALJs who are subject to the APA provisions
that insulate them from sources of pro-agency bias. Unfortunately, Congress continued to decrease
agency use of ALJs and to increase use of AJs. Thus, for instance, while there were twice as many AJs as
ALJs when ACUS published its 1992 report, there were five times as many AJs as ALJs when ACUS published
another study of agency adjudication in 2018.27
Scholars have also identified one unfortunate characteristic of a system of adjudication that relies on
adjudicators who have decisional independence. Judges differ with respect to the combination of beliefs
and values they bring to the task of adjudication. Those differences can create a pattern of inconsistent
decisions. Thus, studies of Social Security disability decisions made by ALJs have found variations in
patterns of decisions so great that the identity of the ALJ who was assigned to the case was the best
predictor of the outcome of the case.28
Inconsistent patterns of decisions can exist in any context in which adjudicators have decisional
independence, including decisions by federal judges. Eliminating or reducing the decisional independence
of judges is not an appropriate response to that problem. There are many ways in which an agency can
reduce the level of inconsistency in an adjudication system. They include (1) issuance of rules that reduce
the discretion of judges; (2) establishing a system of binding precedents; (3) providing an opportunity for
review by a multi-member panel of judges; and, (4) monitoring the patterns of decisions of individual
judges to identify and to counsel judges whose pattern of decisions deviate significantly from the norm.
The Supreme Court’s 2018 opinion in SEC v. Lucia29, created the potential for many more problems to
develop in the agency adjudication process. The Court held that ALJs at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) are inferior officers, rather than employees.30 That holding undoubtedly applies to all
ALJs who preside in adjudications at regulatory agencies. It almost certainly applies as well to AJs who
perform functions analogous to ALJs at many agencies. The holding in Lucia may also apply to the
thousands of ALJs and AJs who preside in adjudicative hearings at agencies that administer benefit
programs. The functions of the ALJs who preside at agencies like the Social Security Administration differ
so much from the functions of the AJs and ALJs who preside at hearings at regulatory agencies, however,
that they may not qualify as inferior officers as the Court described and applied that term in Lucia.
Hearings at agencies that administer benefit programs are not adversarial proceedings. The only party
that participates in the hearing is the applicant for benefits.
The Lucia holding creates serious doubts about the constitutionality of the statutory limits on the power
of agencies to remove ALJs. In its 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,31 the Court held that the
Take Care Clause prohibits Congress from providing two or more layers of insulation of inferior officers
from presidential control in the form of good cause limits on the power to remove inferior officers.32 Since
ALJs can only be removed for cause by the MSPB, and MSPB members can only be removed for cause by
27
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the President, the Free Enterprise Fund holding suggests that the good cause limit on the power to remove
an ALJ is unconstitutional. The Court included a footnote in its opinion that leaves that question in doubt,
however. The Court stated that its holding did not necessarily apply to ALJs.33
Immediately after the Court issued its decision in Lucia, President Trump issued an Executive Order in
which he removed ALJs from the category of Civil Servants who can only be appointed through use of a
competitive meritocratic selection process.34 The E.O. rescinded the rules that subjected applicants to be
ALJs to an elaborate meritocratic selection process implemented by OPM. The E.O. replaced those rules
with a single criterion—to be eligible for appointment as an ALJ an applicant must only be a member of
the Bar of some state. In all other respects, the decision to appoint an ALJ is now completely within the
discretion of the head of each agency. That raises the concern that some agency heads will appoint
incompetent or biased ALJs. There is evidence that some agency heads have already used their discretion
to appoint ALJs and AJs that are incompetent and biased in favor of the views of the head of the agency.35
The combination of the Court’s opinion in Lucia with the Court’s opinions in other recent cases and the
pre-existing structure of the adjudication programs at many agencies raises other serious questions. In its
opinions in Freytag v. Commissioner36 and Edmond v. United States,37 the Court seemed to say that an
officer is an inferior officer, rather than a principal officer, only if they can be removed by a principal officer
and their decisions can be reviewed by a principal officer. The decisions of SEC ALJs are reviewable by the
SEC—an agency headed by principal officers—so SEC ALJs satisfy that criterion to be classified as inferior
officers.
In many agencies, however, decisions of ALJs and AJs are not reviewable by principal officers. Thus, for
instance, the decisions of the hundreds of Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) are not reviewable by any
officer; the decisions of ALJs at SSA are reviewable only by an Appeals Council that is composed only of
inferior officers; the decisions of ALJs at the Department of Agriculture are only reviewable by an inferior
officer; and, the decisions of IJs are only reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals, a Board that
consists only of inferior officers.
In Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew,38 the Federal Circuit held that APJs are principal officers, rather than inferior
officers.39 That holding may be followed by holdings that thousands of other ALJs and AJs are principal
officers, rather than inferior officers. The Arthrex court held that the constitutional flaw in the system of
adjudication at the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board could be remedied by making APJs removable
at will. That remedy is controversial, however. The Supreme Court could easily affirm the holding in
Arthrex but reject the remedy adopted in Arthrex. That would create a legal environment in which
thousands of AJs and ALJs are principal officers rather than inferior officers.
II. The Present State of Agency Adjudication
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The present state of agency adjudication is bad, and it may become far worse in the near future. At
present, eighty per cent of the members of the administrative judiciary are highly vulnerable to pressure
from the politicians that head their agencies. As AJs, they have no statutory safeguards against removal
or other adverse actions that an agency might take if they fail to act in ways that please the head of the
agency.40 In other words, they are highly vulnerable to the systematic pro-agency bias that plagued agency
adjudications before Congress enacted the APA.
The proportion of agency adjudicators who are highly vulnerable to pro-agency bias will increase from
eighty per cent to one hundred percent if the Court extends the holding of Free Enterprise Fund to ALJs,
thereby invalidating the statutory safeguards against removal that are designed to insure that ALJs have
decisional independence. Moreover, because of the combination of the Lucia holding and the Executive
Order that removed ALJs from the category of Civil Servants who are subject to a competitive meritocratic
qualification process, agency heads now have complete discretion to hire AJs and ALJs who are
incompetent and who are expected to act in ways that reflect the biases of the agency head who hired
them.
Cases that are now pending in the Supreme Court and in circuit courts have the potential to destroy
completely the viability of important agency adjudication programs. In the many contexts in which the
decisions of AJs and ALJs are not subject to review by principal officers, the AJs and ALJs arguably are
principal officers rather than inferior officers. As such they must be appointed through the process of
nomination by the president and confirmation by the Senate. It is not at all clear that the President and
the Senate are up to the task. Over the last couple of decades, the process of nomination and confirmation
of principal officers has slowed and become increasingly politicized. That has produced a large and
growing increase in the number of principal officer positions that are vacant for long periods of time.41
Requiring the President and the Senate to more than double the number of principal officers who must
be nominated and confirmed could prove fatal to an appointment process that is already badly broken.
III. Potential Ways of Repairing the Agency Adjudication System
We could attempt to repair the agency adjudication system by returning to the system that Congress
adopted unanimously in 1946 after fifteen years of debate and study to the extent that the modern
Court’s opinions permit a return to that system. If the Court declines to apply the Free Enterprise Fund
holding to ALJs, Congress could require all agencies to conduct agency adjudications as formal
adjudications that are subject to APA sections 554, 556 and 557, and to the many statutory safeguards of
the decisional independence of ALJs. If the Court applies the Free Enterprise Fund holding to ALJs or
Congress is unwilling to require all agencies to use formal adjudication, agencies can bind themselves by
rule to use formal adjudication and not to remove an ALJ except for good cause.42
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Congress cannot require agencies to use the competitive meritocratic system for determining whether
applicants are qualified to become ALJs that OPM long used prior to Lucia. The Court would hold that any
such statute imposes unconstitutional conditions on the President’s power to appoint inferior officers.
However, the President could issue an Executive Order in which he authorizes OPM to implement a similar
system, or agencies could adopt systems of that type by rule.
Finally, Congress can eliminate the risk that many AJs and ALJs will be held to be principal officers, rather
than inferior officers, by amending every statute that now authorizes ALJs and AJs to make final decisions.
If Congress adds a right to obtain intra agency review of ALJ and AJ decisions by a principal officer, the
ALJs and AJs become inferior officers rather than principal officers. Congress would have to amend at least
the Social Security Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the statutes that govern adjudication in
the Department of Agriculture, and the statutes that apply to adjudications conducted by the PTAB to
obtain that result. Of course, Congress would also have to increase the appropriations for each agency to
the extent required to staff the new intra-agency appellate body, and the new appellate positions would
have to be filled through the process of Presidential nomination subject to Senate confirmation.
The disadvantages of this approach to the problem are obvious. Implementation is contingent on the
willingness and ability of Congress, the President and agencies to take many actions, each of which would
be opposed by powerful political forces. The resulting system of adjudication would also be fragile. Its
persistence would depend on the willingness of future Presidents to act in ways that assure that agency
adjudications are conducted through the use of fair procedures and that agency adjudicators continue to
be subject to safeguards on their decisional independence.
An alternative approach would be to create an entirely new system of agency adjudication that is modeled
on the approach that some states have taken in recent years. We could create an Article I court that would
conduct all of the adjudications that are now conducted at agencies.43 To be consistent with the Take Care
Clause, such a system would have to include a process through which the president, a department head
or a court appoints each judge; a process through which the head of the relevant agency or some other
principal officer within the relevant agency can review ALJ decisions; and, a process through which a
principal officer who can be removed by the president at will can remove an ALJ for cause. If the principal
officer with the power to remove an ALJ is the Chief Judge, rather than an agency official, this system
could yield a return to the environment in which ALJs enjoy decisional independence and adjudications
are conducted by unbiased adjudicators.
The disadvantages of this approach are also obvious. It would be a challenge to persuade Congress to
make such a dramatic change in our administrative adjudication system. It would also be a challenge to
design and to implement such a radical new system of adjudication.
The final approach we could take is to build on, and to expand the scope of, our successes in the field of
administrative law. Those successes rely on written hearings to resolve many important types of disputes.
One such success is the use of the notice and comment process to issue rules that reflect and implement
agency policies. When Congress enacted the APA, agencies often relied on adjudication as their primary
promulgate them before current judicial proceedings end, the regulations may moot any challenge because the
Court's judgment would not lead to a remedy that changes anything. The adjudicators would have the same or
more protection from at-will removal even absent the current statutory regime.”).
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means of making policy decisions. Over time rulemaking has displaced adjudication as the primary means
through which agencies make policy decisions. Policymaking through use of notice and comment
rulemaking has enormous well-documented advantages over policymaking through use of adjudication.44
A recent empirical study of the use of notice and comment rulemaking conducted by an outstanding team
of scholars found that agencies have developed extraordinarily rich and effective means of using the
notice and comment process to make policy decisions that are well-supported by data and analysis.45
Rules can interact with adjudications in many ways. Sometimes they eliminate the need for an entire class
of adjudications.46 Sometimes they reduce the scope of a class of adjudications by resolving generically an
issue that otherwise would be contested in every adjudication.47 Sometimes they transform a class of
adjudications from disputes about how to interpret and apply a broad subjective standard to disputes
about how to resolve one or more disputed but objectively verifiable issues.48
A second major success is use of paper hearings to adjudicate many important types of disputes.
Gradually, agencies and courts have come to realize that paper hearings are superior to oral hearings in
the large and important classes of adjudications in which parties disagree only about issues of legislative
fact.49 Thus, for instance, courts have approved of EPA’s decision to switch from oral hearings to written
hearings in cases in which a firm applies for a discharge permit under the Clean Water Act and opponents
argue that that the discharges authorized by the permit will have unacceptable adverse effects on aquatic
biota.50 The written hearings require less time and resources and are more likely to yield accurate and
consistent resolution of contested issues in fields like biology and other hard sciences, as well as in
economics and other social sciences.
Paper hearings also perform well in the context of contested issues of adjudicative fact if those issues are
relatively objective. Thus, for instance, in Mathews v. Eldridge51, the Court held that written hearings are
sufficient to satisfy due process in Social Security disability cases because the doctors whose opinions
44
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dominate in those cases are good at expressing their opinions in writing and because the contested issues
are relatively objective.
In Eldridge, the Court was aware that any applicant who was dissatisfied with the results of a paper hearing
had the statutory right to contest the findings made in the paper hearing in an oral hearing before an ALJ,
so it is plausible that the Court’s resolution of the due process issue was contingent on the subsequent
availability of an oral hearing. That interpretation of Eldridge is dubious, however. The initial decision
whether an applicant is eligible for disability benefits is made by a team that consists of a doctor and a
disability expert. They base their findings on their consideration of all of the opinions of doctors that the
applicant and the government provide to the team plus additional opinions that the team obtains when
it finds gaps in the record that can be filled with additional opinions. If an applicant disagrees with the
findings of the first team of decisionmakers, they can obtain a new paper hearing before a different
doctor/disability expert team of decision makers. If the applicant disagrees with the findings of both of
those decision-making teams based on paper hearings, the applicant can obtain an oral hearing before an
ALJ. It seems unlikely that the availability of that third layer of decision making improves the accuracy and
consistency of the decision-making process. There is no logical reason to believe that an ALJ with no
education or training in human health will make a more accurate decision than two doctor/disability
expert teams of decision makers, particularly when the government does not even participate in the oral
hearing before the ALJ.52
Over time we undoubtedly will discover many more contexts in which the combination of rules that
simplify and objectify the issues that are disputed in a class of adjudications and paper hearings can
replace oral hearings, with the potential for enhanced accuracy and consistency in the decision making
process. Many scholars predict that the constant technological advances we are experiencing in the field
of artificial intelligence will create conditions in which we can replace the vast majority of oral hearings
with paper hearings.53 There will always be an irreducible minimum of cases in which oral hearings are
essential because the stakes are high and the disputed issues are who did what, when, where, and why.
In those contexts, oral hearings are required by due process. That is a small subset of the myriad classes
of cases in which we now rely on oral hearings, however.
Conclusion
The agency adjudication process is in poor condition today and recent Supreme Court opinions have the
potential to make it far worse. We need to make major changes in the system to create conditions in
52
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which we can rely on adjudication to produce accurate and unbiased results. We can attempt to
accomplish that result in one of three ways. We can try to persuade Congress, the President and agencies
to make the many changes in law that are required to recreate the fair and impartial system that Congress
created when it enacted the APA in 1946. We can attempt to persuade Congress to create an entirely new
system of agency adjudication that has as its centerpiece a new Article I court. Finally, we can try to build
on, and increase the scope of. two of our most important successes in the field of administrative law—
notice and comment rulemaking and replacement of oral hearings with paper hearings. I think the third
approach offers the best prospects for success, but we need to move aggressively in one of those
directions if we want to create an agency adjudication process that will perform well in the future.

